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Apropos Descartes Editorial

THIS year sees the three hundredth anniversary of the publication of Descartes' *Discours sur la Méthode*. The interest thus awakened in the work and the man is leading to a more active study of his doctrines. Of course, Descartes has never fallen into oblivion; this could hardly be since he is so commonly considered as "the Father of modern philosophy." But, as is usually the case with doctrines which are no longer formally professed, his teachings are frequently dismissed in a cursory fashion.

The more thorough study which we are expecting has very great value. Philosophy is not a supra-historical entity, brought to its perfection by thinkers independently of the *milieu* in which they find themselves. On the contrary, it is imbedded in history, in the antecedents and environment of those who further its development. Consequently, no philosophical system can be adequately understood apart from a study of those systems or fragments of systems which preceded it in time. This is more obviously true in those instances wherein we can trace a lineal progressive development. But it is equally true in those other cases which show a lack of continuity, for quite frequently the new system will have arisen by way of reaction.

Thus, for the Scholastic philosopher, the study of the teachings of Descartes will bring about a fuller understanding of modern doctrines which seem at first sight to be separated from the Scholastic stand by a veritable chasm. Descartes himself should be quite readily intelligible to a Scholastic. What seems to be a real departure, namely, the Cartesian selection of the idea of the self as the point of departure of philosophy, is itself no more than a further step along the path which decadent Scholasticism had already chosen to follow. The objectivity of St. Thomas was gradually transmuted into the subjectivity of the Nominalists. Now, a "Nominalist in logic" is not a "realist in metaphysics," as Dr. Moody would hold, but already fundamentally, if not actually, a subjectivist. Descartes' separation of the ideal and the real was but the last blow in the severance of consciousness and matter which had been begun several generations before him. The tenuous bridge of the "clear idea" and the "goodness and truthfulness of God," by which Descartes attempted to rejoin what he had separated, was seen by his successors to be a bond altogether too weak. Speculation ran riot in the airy realms of the idealists while the apparently solid

kingdom of matter fell under the sway of an absolute science, which thought itself independent of philosophy. Modern followers of idealism and materialism persuade themselves that they escape Cartesian dualism by denying or explaining away the opposite term. Others, dissatisfied with this escape from a bothersome problem, have tried to reunite the two terms of the exaggerated dualism. So far their efforts have not been brilliantly successful; as a critic has said, Descartes put asunder soul and body, and, like children with the parts of a broken toy, men have not succeeded in really putting them together again.

Viewed in this historical perspective, the modern stand on many points can become more clear to a Scholastic philosopher. We can take as an instance the modern sensationalist concept of the Ego. Considered in itself, this concept would seem to be absurd. But considered genetically, it becomes at least intelligible, though not justified.

Non-Scholastics, too, should find the study of Descartes useful for their better understanding of many Scholastic doctrines. For them, this study will be the retracing of the path that leads from their present position to one more close to that of the *philosophia perennis*. It will bring them back (if the figure may be allowed) to the parting of the ways; it will not put them on the path which Scholasticism has trod. For, the problems of modern philosophy are different in their formulation and consequently call for different treatment and a different solution. Descartes' absolute distinction of mind and body is not the same as the Scholastic distinction of soul and body. Nor again is the absolute bifurcation of being into consciousness and extension the same as the opposition which the Scholastic admits between the concept and its object. The disjunction: God immanent or God transcendent, which modern Monists discuss, is totally different from the distinction between God and the world established by St. Thomas and his fellows.

Of course, the mere knowledge that two groups of thinkers ask different questions about the same thing does not decide which is the formulation demanded by the evidence before us. To study the history of philosophy without application to the study of metaphysics is almost certainly to fall into scepticism. Here, as in so many other cases, there is no complete disjunction; history of philosophy and metaphysics do not exclude each other; rather, they are complementary.

Cartesian Method and Classical Logic

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DESCARTES has often displayed openly his contempt for classical, that is Aristotelian, logic: he blames its intricate rules — “dialecticorum vincula”¹ — and mocks its ponderous definitions. His chief, or rather, more apparent grievance seems to be the futility of such rules; for classical logic does not really help to *find* things, but only to arrange in impressive order truths already possessed:

*Advertendum est nullum posse dialecticos syllogismum arte formare, qui verum concludat, nisi prius ejusdem materiam habuerint, id est, nisi eamdem veritatem, quae in illo deducitur, jam antea cognoverint.*² (We must notice that it is impossible for the dialecticians to formulate according to rule any syllogism, which comes to a true conclusion unless they first have the matter of the syllogism; that is, unless they know beforehand the very truth which is deduced.)

Classical logicians give rules of *logic*, that is, of reasoned exposition, and what Descartes wants is a *method*, that is, rules of real research.

We think, however, that this disagreement comes also from another and perhaps deeper root: Descartes' conception of science is set upon mathematical lines and drawn from mathematical ideals. When yet a mere boy, he had been deeply impressed by the certainty and evidence in mathematics, and wondered why they were used only for mechanical purposes and childish problems.³ He was soon to dream a kind of universal mathematics and to pick up the tradition of the ancient Greeks, who beheld in mathematics the best and even necessary introduction to philosophy.⁴

On the other hand, the conception of science which rules Aristotelian and Scholastic logic is almost entirely alien to mathematical processes. Although Aristotle, in his *Analytics*, appears to be keen about mathematical instances, and expresses his arguments with letters instead of concrete things, as further uses a number of mathematical terms (*akra*, *p̄sou*, *diastema*, etc.), he remains a biologist at heart; for it is evident that the notions of genus, species, and individuality which play so prominent a part in his logic are all drawn from the realm of living things. Properly speaking, there are no individuals, nor species either, among mathematical beings.

Our aim in this paper is to set forth a few points of this disagreement between the Cartesian and Aristotelian conception of science, and to trace them back to their origin, that is, to the altogether different ideal which attracted each philosopher. We are not able, of course, to bring forward every relevant word of Descartes on that matter, so we borrow our quotations mainly from the *Regulae ad directionem ingenii*, a work more significant than the famous *Discours de la Méthode*, in which difficulties and crudities are skillfully smoothed over.

The main processes used by Greek geometers, which Descartes admired so much and from which he took his lessons on method, are as everybody knows *analysis* and *synthesis*. By *analysis* the problem is taken as already

solved. There is no direct attempt therefore at its solution, but the geometrist tries to connect it with some more simple proposition known from other sources. “*Resolutio est via a quaesito tanquam concessso per ea quae deinceps consequuntur ad aliquod concessum.*”⁵ (Analysis proceeds from an assumed proposition to something conceded by means of the consequences of the first.)

In synthesis, on the other hand, the geometrist reverses his process and traces his way back from the known proposition towards the actual problem:

*In compositione autem per conversionem ponentes jam factum id quod postremum in resolutione sumpsimus atque hic ordinantes secundum naturam ea antecedentia, quae illuc consequentia erant, et mutua illorum facta compositione ad quaestum finem pervenimus.*⁶ (But in synthesis we reverse the process, positing now as a fact that proposition which was the final term in analysis. Further, we here arrange in their natural order those antecedents which in analysis were consequences, and by a synthesis of them we reach the goal of our inquiry.)

Both processes are complementary: without previous analysis, synthesis would easily go astray and never reach its objective; on the other hand, without synthesis, analysis does not offer a cogent demonstration, as geometrical propositions are not necessarily reciprocal.⁷

We must insist that, when analyzing a problem into simpler propositions, in order to detect a proposition already granted, the geometrist does not seek genera, but elements, out of which every sort of geometrical figure is formed. We must make clear also that in synthesis, geometers are not interested in a *classification* of geometrical beings. What they are looking for is reasoned construction and for them to *know* (in its fully scientific meaning) is to *make*, to compose simple figures out of elements, or more complex figures out of simpler ones. It would be possible, of course, to classify geometrical figures, arranging them all according to their degree of generality; defining the hexagon, for instance, as a kind of polygon; that would bring out a kind of purely descriptive geometry. But this would not be real geometry, as the Greeks understood it, and would allow only a very superficial knowledge of figures.⁸

One must keep in mind those very elementary geometrical processes when attempting to realize Descartes' conception of Method, and especially when investigating his disagreement with classical logic. For both processes appear to be the mainsprings of his method:

*Tota methodus consistit in ordine et dispositione eorum ad quae mentis acies est convertenda ut aliquam veritatem inveniamus, atque hanc etiam exacte servabimus, si propositiones involutas et obscuras ad simpliciores paulatim reducamus, et deinde, ex omnium simplicissimarum intuitu, ad aliarum omnium cognitionem per eosdem gradus ascendere tentemus.*⁹ (The entire method consists in ordering and arranging the objects to which the attention of the mind is to be directed, that we may discover some truth. We shall preserve this method exactly if we reduce the involved and obscure propositions by degrees to more simple ones; and finally, from an intuition of the simplest propositions we shall endeavor to arrive by the same steps at a knowledge of all the others.)

Therefore a philosopher has to find, at first, the primary elements of knowledge which Descartes calls "*natures simples*,"¹⁰ by means of analysis. These "*natures simples*" are not to be confounded with "*summa genera*"; they are really elements, which (as in the point and line of geometry) are neither more general nor more particular than the other things composed of them. When already in possession of these elements, a philosopher must try to recompose everything out of these simple natures, using only, of course, necessary connections.¹¹

It is clear that in such processes Scholastic definition and classical syllogism are of little use. We must not be surprised, therefore, if Descartes does not think much of Scholastic definitions, either of primary elements or of more intricate beings. The former appear to be obscure and futile. Recalling the definitions of place as "*superficies corporis ambientis*" (the surface of the surrounding body), and of movement as "*actus potentiae prout est in potentia*" (the actuation of potency inasmuch as it is in potency), "*quis intelligit verba haec*," says Descartes, "*et tamen quis ignorat quid sit motus, et quis non fatetur illos nodum in cirpo quaevisse?*"¹² (Who can make anything out of such definitions as these? And yet is there anyone who does not know what motion is, and who will not grant that they [*i. e.*, the Scholastics] sought difficulties where there were none?)

It is better not to attempt any definition of those primary elements; these "*natures simples*" are evident by themselves,¹³ and nothing could be more clear, for they are the very first elements of knowledge. Any attempt to explain them would therefore be ridiculous. The only thing to do about them is to find them through analysis, and when they are found, *i. e.*, distinguished one from another, the research necessarily comes to an end. This is the reason why Descartes does not try to define any of the primary notions: extension, figure, and so forth. Even when he is forced by the inquiries and objections of his opponents to define the nature of thought, his definitions are really only descriptions. We may add, too, that there is another reason why these primary truths and simple natures can be accepted only as facts; it is because they are really only facts, contingent facts. According to Descartes there are no eternal and absolutely necessary truths, but all depend upon God's free will.

Since the starting points of the scientific research are not *genera* but elements, the classical way of defining "*per genus et differentiam*" has to be abandoned; any definition of that kind would be empty and bring only a knowledge from the outside. When one is trying to define anything "*per genus et differentiam*," says Descartes,

*e vestigio quaestiones instar arboris genealogicae ramorum, auctum multiplicatumque iri vides, tandemque omnes hasce egredias quaestiones in meram battologiam quae nihil illustraret et in prima nos relinquere ignorantia, fore ut desinerent satis liquet.*¹⁴ (You will perceive at once that the questions will be increased and multiplied, like the branches of the Porphyrean tree. At length it will be clearly evident that all those abstruse speculations will lapse into mere tautology, which in no wise adds to our knowledge but leaves us in our original ignorance.)

The only way to true definition is to compose notions out

of elements through what Descartes calls "necessary deduction." For instance, instead of repeating that man is "*animal rationale*," which does not tell anything about the real composition of man, one has to find through analysis the essential elements of man, and to recompose him out of them.¹⁵

The word "deduction" is often used by Descartes, but he gives it a very different meaning from the one it retains in classical logic. Because he does not care about general or particular propositions, Descartes cannot accept the classical syllogism which works upon a subalternation of propositions; instead of it he proposes immediate inference: "*veritates unas ex aliis directe deduximus*"¹⁶ (we have deduced the particular truths directly from others). As an example of that process of inference he indicates continual progression, linking one proportion (3-6) with the next one (12 - 24), and so on till he arrives at the recognition of the universal law of progression. Such reasoning is really different from the syllogism for it does not deduce a particular proposition from general premises which should be known beforehand. It is more or less akin to reasoning by "recurrence" or to a sort of induction. We do not want to discuss here the exact nature of that kind of reasoning but it is enough to point out that it has evidently nothing to do with the consideration of classes and subalternation of propositions.¹⁷

This nature of Cartesian reasoning can be made clear from another quarter, for Descartes refuses to draw a definite line between intuition and reasoning; on the contrary, he admits openly that short and easy reasonings are likewise intuitions, reasoning proper taking place only when memory intervenes.¹⁸ Reasoning, therefore, consists essentially in propagating the intuition from one thing to another, and in getting a clear vision of the connection between the two things.

One may ask for what reason Descartes finds himself entitled to pass from one thing to another, as he has put aside the inclusion and separated definitely and absolutely the elements from each other. We must confess that Descartes did not trouble himself to give an explanation about that point; he seems to rely upon intuition which shows clearly the link between the "*natures simples*," even if it is difficult to realize how absolutely simple natures can implicate one another. It is certain, however, in spite of this obscurity, that Descartes' theory of reasoning and logic is not a theory of *inclusion*, but a theory of *connection* and exigency. German philosophers tried to explain those connections and exigencies by means of opposition, and, though this explanation is nowhere to be found in Descartes, he is responsible for those further developments.

A case of Cartesian deduction is "*cogito ergo sum*," which has often been mistaken for a syllogism in disguise. Descartes himself is responsible for the mistake, for, more than once, he appears to represent the "*cogito, ergo sum*" as an abridged, but classical deduction. He confesses, however, that before perceiving his own "*cogito*" and concluding his own existence, he had to be aware of the nature of thought and existence, and to know the general law that

thought implies existence.¹⁹ In another place he says: "cum advertimus nos esse res cogitantes, prima notio est, quae nullo syllogismo concluditur."²⁰ (When we advert to the fact that we are thinking beings, this is our first idea, and one which is not deduced by a syllogistic process.) We have not the presumption to restate in a definite manner that much discussed problem of the "cogito," but it seems that if we have in mind the Cartesian conception of immediate implication, that troublesome "ergo" appears quite understandable, without any appeal to classical syllogisms; for we perceive that thought implies existence, here and now, as its necessary condition. There is no need to justify the "ergo" by the subsumption of a general knowledge of the connection between thought and existence, for it signifies only the immediate apprehension of the three facts:²¹ the fact of my thought, the fact of my existence, and the fact of their connection. This connection is not, we must confess, altogether a pure fact, for it is known as necessary. But this necessity is not derived from an universal law, and general considerations have nothing to do with its detection; there is a causal inference without any use of classes and subalternation — a typical Cartesian deduction which could be equally well represented as a compound intuition.

To conclude: the mathematical bias of Descartes' theory of knowledge appears to be the main root of his disagreement with classical logic, which, dealing chiefly with classes, is definitely biological. It is unnecessary to praise the simplicity and clearness of such a conception. This simplicity is, however, a bit deceptive, and difficulties arise when one is trying to make out that capital notion of "*natures simples*," at the very base of Descartes' method.

Further, we must notice that, carried on by his somewhat naive enthusiasm for mathematical processes, Descartes is guilty of injustice towards this classical logic he despises so much. Although it is true that classification holds a very important part in that logic, real explanation is not altogether absent from it, and we know that Aristotle himself was well aware that explanatory definitions are obtained out of composition of elements.²² We must consider also that if the theory of syllogism is wrapped up in considerations about classes, it does not imply that the syllogism

helps only to classify things and put them in good order. Classes and subalternation of propositions offer a very easy means of teaching the rules of syllogism (and perhaps this side has been unduly emphasized by subsequent logicians, as Euler), but it does not represent its whole nature. Aristotle's affirmation that in a scientific syllogism the middle term ought to represent the cause makes it perfectly clear that he does not consider the syllogism as a pure instrument of classification. Lastly, we must observe that classification is not without any real value in science. To know for instance, that man is *animal rationale* does not tell everything about man, of course, but it points out that man has something in common with dog and cat and horse, and has something different; to place a thing in its context helps to understand it. Geometry is not the only source and ideal of knowledge.

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2. T. X, Reg. X, p. 406.
3. *Discours de la Méthode*, T. VI, p. 7.
4. T. X, Reg. IV, pp. 375-6.
5. Pappus Alexandrinus, *Mathematicae Collectiones*, translated into Latin by Commandin, Bononiae, 1660, p. 240. Descartes often expressed his admiration for Pappus, and it is likely that he read him in the Latin translation of Commandin (first published in 1602).
6. *Ibid.*
7. See A. Robert, "Descartes et l'analyse des Anciens," *Archives de Philosophie*, Vol. XIII, Cahier II, pp. 221 ff.
8. It is true, however, that Euclid himself has been biased by Aristotle's *Analytics*; definitions "per genus et differentiam" can be found in his *Elements*. See Def. VIII and IX, in ed. Pepyrrard, 1814, p. 2, and an attempt at a classification of figures, Def XX-XXV. But this mode of exposition is a borrowed cloak for geometrical reasoning, which remains independent of it.
9. T. X, Reg. V, p. 379.
10. T. X, Reg. XII.
11. T. X, Reg. XII, p. 421.
12. T. X, Reg. XII, p. 426.
13. T. X, Reg. XII, p. 420.
14. *Inquisitio Veritatis*, T. X, pp. 515-16.
15. *Inq. Ver.*, T. X, p. 517.
16. T. X, Reg. VI, p. 381.
17. See T. X, Reg. VI, 384-5.
18. T. X, Reg. VII, p. 387.
19. See *Principia Philosophiae*, I. VII, 1, 8-16; *Inquisitio Veritatis*, T. X, p. 515; *Discours*, T. VI, p. 33.
20. T. VII, 2ae. *Responsiones*, p. 140; see also *Entretien avec Burman*, T. V, p. 147; *Reponses aux instances de Gassendi*, T. IX, p. 205.
21. See J. Chevalier, *Descartes*, (Paris, Bloud), p. 218.
22. See, *Physics*, I, 1.

Augustine on Sensation

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Two approaches to the problems of philosophy are possible, the metaphysical and the psychological. We think of Aquinas, the intellectualist with his steady grasp of reality, as able to sit down before the facts of experience and study out the questions confronting him. This objective method or attitude may be called the metaphysical approach. Augustine, on the other hand, was a man emotional by temperament and not unacquainted with the movements of his own very human soul. His great desire

was to fathom, as far as was humanly possible by the two-fold aid of reason and revelation, the two most important Beings in his life—God and himself. *Noverim te, noverim me*, is his prayerful rendition of the ancient *Nosce te ipsum*. "God and my soul I long to know," he soliloquizes. "Nothing more?" "Absolutely nothing."¹ This is the psychological approach.

The theory of sensation found in the writings of St. Augustine, as Gilson observes,² is one of the points of his

hilosophy which best enable one to understand the distinctive note in his concept of man. It is in this handling of the problems of sense and sense-knowledge that Augustine gives, probably more clearly than anywhere else in his works, the answer to the even more fundamental question of the relationship between soul and body. While preferring to study God and the attainment of beatitude in the light of faith and rational cognition, not until he has seen and understood the functions of body and soul in sensation can he fully appreciate their interrelation.

St. Augustine gives us his own definition of sensation: "I call sensation the soul's awareness of what the body experiences." (*Sensum puto esse, non latere animam quod atitur corpus.*)³ It is thus the *non latere*, awareness, or non-ignorance, on the part of the soul of what the body experiences that constitutes the essential note of sensation. In several works he employs the same definition, sometimes altering the wording slightly, but always including the fundamental *non latere*. Thus, for instance, sensation is described as a "suffering" (*passio*), or experiencing, of the body which does not escape the notice of the soul (*non latens animam*).⁴

It will be noted immediately that St. Augustine never applies the term *passio* to the soul; it is always the body that "suffers" or is the object of the experience. In the *De Musica* he explicitly denies that the soul "suffers" anything from the body, and when speaking of the effect of sensible bodies he insists that "they do not produce anything in the soul, but in the body."⁵

From this fact alone it becomes obvious that he wishes to stress the independence of mind from matter. This independence he makes complete, in that the soul can in no way depend upon the body, not even in its acquisition of notions of material things. Indeed, he nowhere denies the adage "*nil in intellectu quod non prius fuerit aliquo modo in sensu;*" he merely insists that the body, being material, cannot act upon a spiritual soul. It is an anticipation of the whole problem of *Species*, later to vex scholastic thinkers.

The reason for this insistence on the activity of the soul in all processes of sensing is not hard to see. It is simply the principle, so common in early medieval philosophy, that the inferior being can in no way act upon the superior; or in Augustine's words: "The agent is in every way superior (*praestantior*) to the being acted upon, nor can the body be in any way superior to the spirit, but rather the spirit is remarkably superior to the body."⁶ It was the application of this principle that proved the last bulwark of Augustinianism before the onslaughts of Thomism in the thirteenth century.

Elsewhere had he spoken of the human composite in terms which might be interpreted as implying an exaggerated dichotomy. Thus, in reply to the query: "What is man?" he defines: "A rational soul possessing a body."⁷ Again man is described as "a rational soul . . . using a mortal and earthly body."⁸ From these two and other definitions and isolated quotations the student of Augus-

tine might be led falsely to conclude that Augustine did not believe in the unity of man. Indeed, we are not infrequently reminded of the Platonic horse and rider, harp and harpist, and other illustrations of dualism. On the other hand, however, Augustine frequently does insist that "the soul possessing a body does not make two persons but one man."⁹ Yet the very frequency and vehemence of his insistence lead one to suspect that Augustine feels it necessary to obviate a mistaken impression which might easily arise in the minds of his readers. In fact, from our coign of vantage, observing in retrospect the history of philosophy, we see how errors did arise in the case of certain would-be interpreters, such as the occasionalists and innatists.

Nevertheless, if the soul did not depend upon the external world for its acquisition of sense knowledge, how was Augustine to avoid the pitfalls of subjectivism and its consequent skepticism? Now St. Augustine was far too penetrating a thinker and student of psychology to descend to a mere subjectivism, but the problem remained. How could sensible cognition depend upon outside objects if the body could in no way act upon the soul? He saw the dilemma and set to work to solve it.

The problem has been handled in a number of his works, but nowhere more convincingly nor with greater detail of analysis than in the sixth book of *De Musica*. This treatise, as its name implies, deals with the rules and study of prosody, a subject in which Augustine was very much at home after his years spent as a *rhetor*. In the last book, felicitously digressing from his subject, he proceeds to show how we perceive meter in poetry, illustrating with the familiar line of St. Ambrose, *Deus creator omnium*. From this example of rhythm he develops the whole question of sensation, and in the analysis given is presented his theory. The whole is studied not aprioristically, but with a careful view of and examination into certain data of internal experience.

First, as has been seen, Augustine insists that the soul "suffers" nothing from the body, but rather, that it "deals with it and acts in it as in something placed by divine power in subordination to itself." (*Facere de illo et in illo tamquam subiecto divinitus dominationi suae.*)¹⁰ Further, when dealing with the sensation of pain, he declares that it is called a sensation "because of attention, when the experience does not escape the notice of the soul" (*propter attentionem, cum eam non latet*).¹¹ After repeating that the soul "suffers" nothing from the body, he adds: "but in its (the body's) experiences (*passionibus*) the soul acts attentively, and the fact that these actions, either easy and pleasant or hard and painful, do not escape its notice really constitutes sensation."¹² Again the *non latere*, with a further emphasis on the attention which the soul exercises.

Later, in the *De Genesi ad Litteram*, Augustine becomes even more specific. "Nor is it the body that senses," he declares, "but the soul through the body, which it uses as a messenger in order to produce in itself what is an-

nounced without."¹³ It is thus patent that the body does not sense, but rather the soul acting through the medium of the body. This same emphasis on the word *per* (through) we shall see to have been made by Plato. In his *Retractioes*, Augustine reaches the conclusion that the ability to sense belongs to the soul: *est enim sensus et mentis.*¹⁴ Finally, since, as has been noted, the soul and body constitute not two but one person, he affirms that "the soul commingling with the body perceives, through a corporal sense."¹⁵

Several difficulties arise to disturb the student of Augustinian psychology. First there is the passage in which the imagination is defined as "nothing but a wound or blow (*plaga*) inflicted by the senses."¹⁶ This text, while appearing to contradict what has been observed above concerning the activity of the soul, in reality states only that the sensation causes the imagination, and not how it causes. Then too, nothing is mentioned about the production of ideas or thought.

The *De Trinitate* presents another apparent contradiction.

And since, in this case, the perception does not proceed from that body which is seen, but from the body of the living being that perceives, with which the soul is tempered together in some wonderful way of its own; yet vision is produced, that is, the sense itself is informed, by the body which is seen. . . . Therefore vision is produced from a thing that is visible, together with one who sees. . . .¹⁷

The difficulty, however, is easily handled, since Augustine nowhere states that the soul is acted upon by the body, but only that the body is affected by the external object. The informing soul, substantially united to the body, perceives the sense affected by the external object.

One has not to look far in order to find the sources of St. Augustine's theory of sensation. We have already seen that it is but the natural outgrowth of his concept of the relationship of soul and body. It is a matter of common knowledge that neo-Platonism had a powerful influence on his thought, and indeed many years before, Plotinus had written at least one sentence which, for its content and expression, we might imagine to be from the *De Musica*. According to him, "in vision, when the sense of sight acts, the eye is the one suffering." (*To paschon.*)¹⁸ Thus he too insists upon the fact that it is not the soul, but the body, that "suffers."

Going back even further to the first proponent of this type of theory of sensation, we find Plato, through the mouth of his master Socrates, declaring that "the union of soul and body in one common affection and one common motion you may properly call perception."¹⁹ As Piat points out, this concourse of soul and body is peculiar to Plato, but not in the sense that he may be considered a predecessor to the Aristotelian view of their union. For indeed "*l'âme seule peut connaître; et, par suite, l'âme seule est capable de sentir.*"²⁰ In the *Theaetetus* Plato makes a very subtle distinction, difficult enough to reproduce in English, but fundamental if we are to understand the rôles played by body and soul in sensation. He considers the senses as those things

"through which" (*dia hōn*) rather than "by which" (*hois*)²¹ we perceive, reserving the faculty of perception to the soul. Sense, then is not the faculty *which* perceives, but merely the medium *through which* the soul obtains knowledge of the object outside itself. Eight chapters of the *Timaeus* are reserved for a discussion of sensible qualities, and throughout them the same insistence on the activity of the soul is evident.

As the Augustinian view of the relation of body and soul exercised a profound influence over subsequent medieval and later Catholic thought, *a pari* we find the same with regard to the theory of sensation. An emphasis on the spiritual side of man as distinct from his material side is to be found throughout St. Augustine's writings. Particularly noteworthy is the sentence concluding the ninth book of the *Confessions*. He had just given a very touching account of his mother's illness and now pithily but significantly ends: "That holy and devout soul was freed from its body." (*Anima illa religiosa et pia corpore soluta est.*) Ever since St. Paul found the "law of his members fighting against the law of his spirit" and sighed that he be released "from the body of this death," Christian asceticism had emphasized the superiority of the soul over the body. Yet there is hardly any doubt that Augustine's treatment of the topic exercised a deep, albeit perhaps indirect, influence upon spiritual writers like St. Ignatius, who bids the exercitant in his *Spiritual Exercises* "consider our soul in this corruptible body, as it were in a prison." The theme runs through almost all of Christian ascetical thought.

Among the philosophers directly influenced by Augustine's theory of sensation during the earlier middle ages we can merely mention Scottus Eriugena, Anselm, Robert Grosseteste, Peter John Olivi, William of Auvergne, and Alexander of Hales. St. Bonaventure, in his psychology of sensation as well as in other phases of his philosophy is a close follower of St. Augustine. As Maritain observes he succeeded perhaps best "in recapturing Augustine's lofty inspiration, and a ray of his wisdom."²² He it was who held out longest and most effectively, upholding the tradition of his great master until it was eventually no longer overwhelmed but synthesized into the greater Scholastic system known as Thomism. Gilson affirms that "sa pensée demeure en effet sur ce point sous l'influence dominante de saint Augustin. . . ."²³ Later he states that "*la perception de la qualité sensible . . . requiert un mouvement de cette faculté par lequel elle se trouve vers l'espèce sensible: conversio potentiae apprehensivae super illam.*"²⁴ That St. Bonaventure likewise insisted upon the activity of the soul and the passivity of the body in sensation, is evident from a passage in the fourth book of his *Sententiae*: "*In potentia sensitiva . . . activa potentia est ex parte animae, passiva ex organo,*"²⁵ which, rendered freely, indicates that in the matter of sensation, the active rôle is played by the soul and the passive by the body.

Finally, the reader of Augustine's works cannot fail to be impressed by the striking analogies between his psycho-

logical method and that of contemporary psychologists. Both offer what might be styled the experimental approach, as is evident in his treatment of the phenomena of attention and inattention.

We sometimes do not hear people speaking near us, not because the soul is not active, but because the strength of the impression is lessened by the attention of the soul being focused on some other object. But if the impression remains, it will remain in the memory, so that we both sense and realize that we sense.²⁸

In this and other passages St. Augustine clearly shows that he recognizes various sub-conscious phenomena.

Thus, among the distinctive features of the Augustinian theory of sensation we may merely mention that it precludes the entire problem and difficulties of *species* and *intellectus agens*. It easily accounts for certain psychological phenomena, like the activity of the sub-conscious mind. On the other hand, if it may have been the occasion of error to certain lesser philosophers who misunderstood his system, it has been found to be in reality greatly removed from innatism, occasionalism, and other psychological heterodoxies. But perhaps most important of all, it gives the student of Augustinian thought a definite insight into that great thinker's view on the constitution of the human composite, a view built upon sound psychological and philosophical bases, with empirical rather than purely dialectical foundations. *Noli foras ire*, Augustine had prudently advised; *in te ipsum redi*.

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Dewey's Esthetic Experience

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SYSTEMATIC studies of Professor Dewey's humanism and of his philosophy in general have been offered by such able critics as Mercier¹ and Feldman,² and more recent indictments of his stand on faith³ and education⁴ have been brought to public notice. But as the earlier criticisms did not cause Dewey to abandon the philosophical prepossessions with which he began half a century ago, it is unlikely that the later will do so. He seems indeed to have enshrined these prepossessions, or presuppositions, in his consummate work, *Art as Experience*.

Dewey maintains that all rules and principles are provisional and tentative. He identifies a thing, at least a thing of value, with its genesis or the process of producing it. This latter is particularly awkward in a treatise on art, where he needs as never before the subjective phase of consciousness, yet insists that the experience is not something *in* the subject, but a relation *between* the subject and the object; the experience is the process of bringing it about, it is in short the *interaction* between the organism and the environment. And although no one has ever denied his wearisome assertion that an organism modifies the environment and the environment modifies the organism, Dewey still adheres to his expansion of that law to include even ideas: "an idea is the changes . . . it effects

in objects" (*Experimental Logic*, p. 310). Similarly, his antipathy to "antecedent reality" would not only exclude God but would deny any fixed status even to past events in the world, because, according to his earliest presupposition that "existence means existence for consciousness" (*Mind*, xi, 1886), an event looks different in the light of subsequent events, and therefore *is* different. His realism thus reduces to pure phenomenism, and although he professes to admit nothing that is not immediately experienced, it is disconcerting to find him admitting scientific objects which are not so experienced.

Dewey's vogue in philosophy is a thing carried over from the field of education. And as the principal vehicle for his reputation, there was his theory that pupils are not to learn things by rote or on authority, but should be presented with problems and set to working out solutions. Or, when the pupil accepts the answers arrived at by others, he is to go over the process that led to the solution. Now this is good educational theory and its acceptance is a compliment to the profession, but the claim that Dewey originated it is preposterous. Even St. Thomas uses it; nor did he invent it. But uncritical readers who admire Dewey have not learned his own lesson, to think for themselves, where religion is concerned. And although

they may not be able to follow his philosophical writings with much comprehension, they do understand that secularism is his solution and they accept it without question. Religion must go.

Religion is put forward by its protagonists as something good, and more particularly as an essential of the "good life." In like manner, John Dewey maintains that the sum and scope of philosophy is the good. "Our constant and inalienable concern," he says, "is with good and bad. We are constructed to think in terms of value" (*Experience and Nature*, p. 32). "All men think with a moral bias and concern" (*Democracy and Education*, p. 172). He even sums up the entire history of philosophy as "a living picture of the choice of thoughtful men about what they would have life to be" (*Reconstruction in Philosophy*, p. 25). "In some sense," he reiterates, "all philosophy is a branch of morals" (*Experience and Nature*, p. 33).

It must not however be overlooked that, since Dewey ignores God and, by reducing his Hegelianism to materialism, rather sweepingly rejects metaphysics, his only recourse is to attach the "value" or good to the person or persons experiencing it. He most emphatically endorses Aristotle's dictum that "man is a social animal," and consequently is bent on making the "experienced good" an interaction. Man, however, is for Dewey preeminently an organism, and "social" is little more than what is implied by the biological term "environment." That statement can be verified by reference to almost any page that Dewey has ever written. As a result, the experience he speaks of is predominantly sentient and emotional. I do not mean that he denies intelligence in man; to him intelligence is an evolutional emergent, and so represents an advance over sense; but intelligence is reduced to the capacity for perceiving relationships, and only those relationships which will enable the thinker to reap a more enjoyable harvest of experiences. And, experience to have "value" must be novel; nor is there any "thinking" except to bring about the new. In such experience both the organism and the environment are changed, the thinker and the object alter one another.

The general purport of *Art as Experience* — the work I intend especially to discuss — is to describe this interaction of the "live creature" and the environment. While man is "doing things" to his material, the material is "doing things" to the man. It is a game of give and take, of "doing" and "undergoing," as Dewey phrases it. The artist attacks the bronze, stone, or canvas, and they attack him. From the encounter, directed by the artist's intelligence, there issue enjoyable experiences for the artist. Appreciation of art proceeds in like manner; for in viewing a work of art we go through (so Dewey says) something of the same experiences the artist went through in producing it. If you ask what the esthetic experience is, you will not get much help from Dewey, beyond his telling you it is a certain "*quale*"; because, as is well known, he is forever concerned with how things are generated, not with what they are. In fact he seems to think that

how they are generated is what they are (cf., e. g., p. 190).

In his voluminous treatise on art Dewey studiously avoids any discussion of religious experience. That is because his whole intent is to replace religion by Deweyan monism and Deweyan sensism. When you realize that this work is, as one reviewer has said, the summation of fifty years of publication, you begin to understand the ultimate goal of Dewey's philosophical endeavors. It will be well therefore to glance at the immediate antecedents of what may be called his *Summa*.

Although the *Quest for Certainty* is his most insidious attack on religion, it is in his little book called *A Common Faith* that he most openly displays his antipathy. He makes a distinction between "religions" and "religious." He is utterly opposed to the former but heartily espouses the latter. This is not merely because he prefers adjectives to nouns, but because he is persuaded from his reading of so-called histories of religions that all institutional religions with rites, organization, and doctrines, are an evil. "Creeds and cults must go" (*A Common Faith*, p. 28). Yet he hankers for the zest and enthusiasm which religions engender; so, while we scrap the institutions, we are to salvage "morality touched with emotion" (p. 22), and that is to be the "emancipation of religious from religions" (p. 27). Instead of God (unacceptable, because already extant) we are to have an "ideal" that is still to be realized. And as religions have fostered the worship of an "unseen power," so in the new order "an unseen power controlling our destiny becomes the power of the ideal" (p. 23). "Awe and reverence" are to be replaced by the "dignity of human nature...as a cooperating part of a larger whole" (p. 25). This monistic concept is preferable to the God of Judaism and Christianity, because any Divinity "having prior and therefore non-ideal existence" is supposed to put a quietus on all emotion and endeavor; for Dewey, "God" is the "unity of all ideal ends arousing us to desire and actions" (p. 42). He charges that the acceptance of an "antecedent reality" (p. 43) kills all stimulus for intellectual inquiry and social betterment; whereas, if the good, or the God, we hope for is still to be created, then the religious emotions are fired to action. Only in this way, he thinks, can we promote the increase and spread of the experiential and concrete goods which are Dewey's God, to wit: "the values of art in all its forms, of knowledge, of effort and rest after striving, of education and fellowship, of friendship and love, of growth in mind and body" (p. 51). He complains bitterly of the persistence of religionists and metaphysicians, who by regarding some things as eternally true are victims of the "art of acceptance"; and he champions the "art of control," for which there is nothing unchangeable. In this vein he writes, "Faith in the continued disclosing of truth through directed human endeavor is more religious in quality than any faith in a completed revelation" (*The Quest for Certainty*, p. 26).

What Dewey offers is not religious at all, it is in fact simply emotional. What he wants us to do is to discard

the old instrument for producing intense emotion, and substitute another instrument. The instrument is not to be man cooperating with God to produce a better man, but man cooperating with nature to produce a better God. This latter scheme for engendering pleasing emotions is Dewey's paradise; but there are those who have reason to think it is a "fool's paradise." Such wishful thinking, because it is not grounded on realities which cold reason is forced to accept, only paves the way to a rude awakening.

Even in Dewey's own philosophy it is difficult to discover any grounds for his declaring war against rites and cults, because these are after all devised to engender the religious ardor of which he makes so much. And they have often been changed to suit the temper of different ages. Yet Dewey would have it that ceremonies are more sacred to religions than are the very creeds. He thinks that creeds have been outmoded by new cosmogonies, by Copernicus, Newton, Darwin, and Einstein; but some of the churches have accommodated themselves. He then makes this astounding statement: "The Catholic church, particularly, has shown leniency in dealing with intellectual deviations as long as they do not touch discipline, rites, and sacraments" (*A Common Faith*, p. 63). This flagrant disregard for facts makes one wonder whether Dewey's animus against "religions" is nothing more than a puritanical obsession against what he has been indoctrinated to believe is "superstition."

In *Art as Experience* he does not argue so openly against religion, but assumes a cavalier manner toward it. He writes, for instance, that the Almighty, in creating the world, "only at the end of that period . . . was aware of just what he set out to do with the raw material of the chaos that confronted him. Only an emasculated subjective metaphysics has transformed the eloquent myth of Genesis into the conception of a Creator without any unformed matter to work on" (p. 65). Such a statement has a more devastating effect on the average reader than reams of argument. In the same strain he insinuates the old canard that religion was foisted on the populace by priests and kings. "Once," he says, "art . . . expressed only that aspect of experience that had a priestly and royal sanction" (p. 152). And while admitting that "religious values have exercised an almost incomparable influence on art," he refers to the religious themes of the past as "Hebrew and Christian legends" (p. 319).

Dewey without question intends to be a monist. He maintains that nothing exists except this world. We may frame the argument of monists as follows: The total is all that exists; but this world is the total; therefore this world is all that exists. There is, of course, an equivocation here in the use of the word total. No one can deny that the world is the total world, but that does not mean it is the total of reality. Despite this fallacy the argument seems to satisfy the logic of the Monists. Modern Monists, moreover, postulate that the total continually evolves

into something better, and that all the parts actively participate in this evolution. "Thus the parts," says Dewey, "vitally serve in the construction of the expanding whole" (p. 166). In keeping with his constant formula, he considers all reality to be adequately conceived as "organism and environment"; he even equates these with subject and object (p. 277) and says that they combine into a unity as hydrogen and oxygen in water (p. 259). "Subjective and objective have so cooperated that neither has any longer an existence by itself" (p. 287). There is no God other than this world, and man is simply nature's most efficient organ. "Science," he avers, "has shown that man is a part of nature . . . his impulsions and ideas are enacted by nature within him" (p. 338). In this he would have us find that satisfaction which religion once gave. "The whole is felt as an expansion of ourselves . . . a particularly satisfying sense of unity in itself and with ourselves" (p. 195). Dewey is clearly trying to replace God by some vague, all-pervading, incomplete reality, which can be experienced only through esthetic emotionalism.

Dewey shares the usual monist's antipathy to the Christian God, Who is said to be perfect, "finished," unchanging. To the evolutionary Monist all reality is a process. There is "no final term." "It carries on and is therefore instrumental as well as final" (p. 139). There are no nouns; everything is a verb, even the apparently static thing referred to as a work of art; "without the meaning of the verb the noun remains blank" (p. 51). We are continually reminded that the organism changes the environment and the environment changes the organism; that the only use of the mind is to find some way out of an impasse to a new and gratifying experience. "Knowledge is instrumental," he repeats, "to the enrichment of experience through the control over action which it exercises" (p. 290). Permanence and continuity are merely the "forces and structures that endure through changes; at least when they change, they do so more slowly than do surface incidents, and thus are, relatively, constant" (p. 323). The very artist is produced as well as his painting; "the self is created in the creation of objects" (p. 282). The appreciation, too, proceeds in like manner; "what it does to us and with us, *that is its nature*" (p. 243).

We may note here in passing that since the Monist's god is really a creature, change is quite compatible with its nature. It is also true that change often gives zest to life as he knows it. It is not true, however, that man is interested only in change. Dewey charges theists with striving for a condition of Nirvana (p. 17). Nothing could be farther from the truth. For theists, the perfect state is one of life, not death. How God can be the intensest form of life and yet not change may be something of a mystery; but since man will never become God, life without change is not a thing which we hold out to man. Monists make the mistake of supposing that since they in their system aspire to become God — their God, namely, an ideal to be realized—we, in our system, expect to be identified with our God.

But what does Dewey offer in the way of argument? His argument is to describe our common experiences. And all you need to make a description telling is a point of view. But it is folly to suppose, if the description is a success and the reader says "true," that the point of view is the only one possible; and a greater folly to suppose that such point of view is the ultimate explanation not merely of the experience, but of the things described. This prevised, we may say that Dewey has selected a fairly successful point of view. In general it is hegelian. Hegel's scheme was triadism, or triangulation: posit one base angle, and the opposite springs up; then the two struggle to a vertex where there is a union of the opposites in a higher synthesis. Dewey sees things not merely as triangles, but rather as lozenges, or diamonds—two triangles base to base. Thus things start from a point under some impulse, but fall out of harmony, divide, produce "tension," then by struggle arrive at a better harmony. Only, of course, they fall out again. Equipped with such a device, and carefully selecting experiences, one can make almost any reader say "true." Many experiences do proceed in that manner. But a principle of description is not a principle of explanation. Nor does the success of such a literary device entitle the author to dictate a monistic conclusion, when a theistic conclusion is at least equally compatible with the experiences described. If Dewey chooses to describe the interesting factors of life as "suspense and anticipation" (p. 137), I see no reason to quarrel with him over that. If an artist experiences an impulse, a problem and a solution, and if appreciation of art means "to go through in our own vital processes the processes which the artist went through" (p. 325), surely such experiences are not excluded—rather they are heightened—by a belief in God and even by a liking for "rites and cults." But just as Hegel's triadic descriptions do not compel us to accept Hegel's Absolute, so neither does Dewey's variation of the scheme force us to the conclusion that all reality is nothing but a process.

Art has often been said to be the embodiment of the universal in a particular. But for Dewey "universal" means that the work of art has a wide range of appeal, it contacts the many, it "awakens others to the perception of new possibilities" (p. 82). Dewey is nothing if not social. And since each person has all others as environment, and since, as we have seen, "experience is a matter of interaction of organism with environment" (p. 246), "art as experience" must be social. Dewey even closes his book with the devout hope that art may dry up the sources of war and bring about the union of mankind by employing science and machinery for a new form of art. But that art, to do so, must exclude religion he is at no pains to show.

With Scholastics, religion is a moral obligation recognized by the intellect, and it is a virtue to be practiced whether we like it or not. But we also recognize and experience the fact that religion has a very strong emotional appeal. In the midst of the "mystery, uncertainty and

doubt" of which Dewey makes so much, religion offers a sounder hope of a happy solution than mere canvas and stone. Religion inspires the confidence of protection and the anticipation of continued happiness, the joy of friendship, gratitude for favors, wonder at God's knowledge and power, the consolation of reconciliation after a fault; above all, religion provides an outlet for the boundless love of the human heart by the assurance of a surpassingly worthy Object. These are emotions which touch the deepest chords that our nature knows. If man chooses to exclude religion from his life, nature demands some other way for these emotions to find their exercise. In his earlier works Dewey was content for the most part to describe the evolutionary parade, satisfied that his followers would exchange religion for the feeling of their own importance as actors in a great cosmic adventure; but as he grew older he turned, like many another disillusioned philosopher, to art as a more immediate stimulus to emotion. He made art his religion.

In speaking of art-appreciation he emphasizes "the mystic aspect of complete surrender that renders it so akin to what religionists call ecstatic communion" (p. 23). He discards a supermundane God as being the invention of priests and kings "to disguise the discords and cruelties in existence"; for him, the ideal god is "enjoyed experience" (p. 185). Artists are to know no other rule than "to serve enlargement of personal experience" (p. 301). There is to be no return to religion. "Secularism," he asserts, "saved art from degeneration" (p. 152). And he lauds "the secular experiences that were emerging at the time of the Renaissance" (p. 330). Art is to take over the role of religion. "Art departs from what has been understood and ends in wonder. In this end, the human contribution is also the quickened work of nature in man" (p. 270). Nature "is in us and we are in it" (p. 333); "art is an extension of the power of rites and ceremonies to unite man" (p. 270); and it engenders "a quality of esthetic experience that is so immediate as to be ineffable and mystical" (p. 293).

Since Dewey's analysis of reality, as we have seen, resulted in phenomenism, the only thing for him to do was to turn frankly to sense experience. In art, he says, the "sense element subdues the intellect" (p. 20). The artist's subject-matter is the "qualities of direct experience" (p. 73); meaning is simply the "possession of objects which are experienced" (p. 83); "value" is an emotion (p. 84). "It cannot be asserted too strongly," he repeats, "that what is not immediate is not esthetic. . . . We cannot grasp an idea until we have felt and sensed it, as much as if it were an odor or a color" (p. 119). Just as the Dewey educationists teach that children should be allowed to follow their own feeling of interest and muddle through to their own solutions, and that the only control of human actions should be the hoped-for agreeable experience, so Dewey says in *Art as Experience* that it is by imagination instead of by rational principle that the union of mankind is to be expected (cf. Chap. xi). Whither such counsel

would lead may be surmised. I only instance the fact that after discoursing on the need of the "dream state" for the creation and the appreciation of art, he inserts in his book a lascivious picture called "*Joie de Vivre*" by Matisse, and opposite it he writes: "Images and ideas succeed one another according to their own sweet will, and the sweetness of the succession to feeling is the only control that is exercised" (p. 276). One cannot but fear that Dewey, having abandoned the "theological tradition" (p. 291), is encouraging not only sensism but sensualism.

In conclusion we need merely note that Dewey's aversion for the "antecedently real" is carried to the extent of ignoring the fact that in his own scheme the world has not simply been in existence from eternity but has been *improving* from eternity; and yet it contains so many evils that he uses these as an argument against theism. But if an eternity of amelioration has not sufficed to remove them, then they are irremovable; and his philosophy as a consequence is not really monism, but theological dualism—and dualism of the sort in which the good can never overcome the evil. Dewey's pretence that science has destroyed the evidence for the existence of a theistic God, because forsooth new cosmogonies have been accepted in place of the old ones, is so shallow as to appear insincere; and yet he will not follow up the scientific evidence for

entropy, so inimical to his theory of evolution from eternity. On the other hand he makes much of interest in life; but he rejects individual immortality, with the result that we are introduced to human joys only to learn that they cannot last. Others who come after us will, theoretically, enjoy the world more intensely, only to feel the disappointment more keenly. Again, Dewey does not admit that the will of man is really free (cf., e. g., *Quest for Certainty*, pp. 123, 126); men indeed are more responsive to their surroundings than are sticks and stones, and some men are more responsive than others; but everything acts the way it must act, and there is really nothing any one can do of his own accord to help or harm the world. Everything happens, not indeed mechanically, but nonetheless necessarily; and men are condemned to perpetual and irredeemable slavery. That is Dewey's substitute for religion. Should men accept it, it would be no wonder if, like the atheists of old, "despairing, they gave themselves up to all lasciviousness."

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Is There a Common Ground in Sociology?

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Is there a common ground in the science of Sociology upon which all sociologists, Catholic as well as non-Catholic, may stand? Is there both a non-Catholic and a Catholic Sociology?

To answer this question even tentatively it will be necessary to explore the acknowledged terrain of Sociology, if there be one, to plummet its depth, and to determine its precise limits. This is a very difficult task since as yet no universally-established, essential definition exists. Sociology is the Benjamin of the sciences, and some even question its right to the name of science. According to them, like the natural sciences in the past, such as Physics, Chemistry, Mechanics, and Biology, Sociology must grow into full maturity before it shall deserve the name of a distinct science; and until it is strong enough to throw off its supporters and make its own strides, it will necessarily lean heavily on other definitely recognized branches of learning. Nevertheless it is a lusty infant, growing fast, and giving promise of great value. The ever-increasing "Social Science Series," comprising numerous volumes and printed by various publishers (apparently their chef-d'œuvre) is an unmistakable sign of the attention paid to this new arrival in the family of learning. The very concept of Sociology is but an embodiment of the new era of society through whose nascent period we are now passing.

Sociology is a modern word. Auguste Comte (1798-1857) coined it in 1839 in order to give expression to a synthesis of all human knowledge stored up in previous centuries. Since Comte's day Sociology has served as a convenient term to express the study of human relations. Comte's Sociology was erected on the foundation built by Hume in his *Treatise of Human Nature*. Philosophy was veering towards a study of the group, and so a phase of positive Philosophy became Sociology. Later, J. S. Mill (1806-1873) gave it the name of "Social Philosophy." Following him, Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) introduced the word to the world in his *Study of Sociology*.

Sponsored for Darwin by Spencer, the theory of Evolution now entered and spread like wild-fire because it offered an alluring interpretation of society as an organism. Organic evolution gave a social aspect to the origin of races as well as to some phases of Psychology and Ethics, and thus brought into being the sciences of Anthropology, Social Psychology, Social Pathology, and Criminology.

This, in brief, seems to describe the genesis of Sociology. Little wonder, then, that Sociology invites comparison to a rapacious cuttlefish, of not eight or ten, but of a hundred arms, a centopus, if I may give it that name, which extends those arms to snatch up anything that may appeal and endeavors to assimilate it.

Of course, Sociologists like Giddings, Hayes, and others indignantly repudiate this intruder into the family as an unnatural child. It must be given a name other than Sociology. Sociology, they contend, is a noble scion whereas Social Pathology is nothing but a study of the diseased body, and as such is termed by one "the costs of the progress of society." So we shall have to await the time when Sociology's precise concept will have found universal acclaim.

At present, however, Sociology is variously defined, according to its object as the study of "the group" or of "human society" or of the "human community" or of the "phenomena of the group." These vague definitions present the material object of Sociology but leave us in complete darkness regarding the exact nature of its formal object. Somewhat more specific are such definitions as the following: "Sociology is that technique which approaches the knowledge of human experience as a whole through investigation of group aspects of the phenomena."

A study of the *group* directly, and not the individual, is definitely established in Sociology; but if we inquire further into the precise nature and scope of this investigation, we shall find ourselves floundering. We shall presently discover that we are in eddies of Historical Sociology, or Educational Sociology, or Rural and Urban Sociology, or Social Psychology, and others. Or perhaps we become aware that we are travelling various lanes or "approaches," as they are called, to Sociology — the psychological, the cultural, the ecological, the methodological including Social Research with its survey and statistics—a bewildering field and one without a reliable compass. Human experiences of the group are to be studied and interpreted. But what is a human experience? For this purpose norms and standards are imperative. What are these norms and standards? Have they been defined and acknowledged by competent authorities? When it is a matter of interpreting human experiences of the group with ill-defined standards, we soon discover that we have *quot homines, tot sententiae*. Rapid and extensive changes have been made in Sociology throughout the brief period of its development, and still greater changes are bound to occur in subsequent periods until the Science has been definitely determined in its scope and object. Six leading tendencies are enumerated by Albion W. Small, Head of the Department of Sociology at the University of Chicago—1) Methodology, that is, attitudes and criticisms of viewpoints; 2) Group Psychology, exemplified in the works of Ross and Cooley; 3) Social Analysis, an elaboration of the second, obtained by taking particular social groups; 4) Social Survey, an application of standards or scientific methods to the study and solution of social problems; 5) The Case Method or Social Diagnosis, as we find it in the work of Miss Mary Richmond; and 6) Social Technology, the unfolding of concrete programs for reconstruction.

From all that has been said thus far, it is manifest that Sociology, as a distinct branch of learning which claims a field exclusively for itself, is still in the making. Its material and formal object are much controverted. Hence its

scope and definition are widely mooted among Sociologists. Outside of Catholic Colleges in America, Sociology in the main is atheistic, agnostic, evolutionistic, deterministic, materialistic, and unethical. This may be gathered from the vast library of books on Sociology. Like Economics, it is averred, Sociology must not be controlled by ethical principles. It is as unmoral as Astronomy.

What common basis, then, can exist for Catholic and non-Catholic Sociology? Whether we conceive Sociology, with Charles Ellwood, F. H. Giddings, E. Hayes, and others, as a philosophy of History, or as an interpretation of the evolution of society from a primitive to a civilized condition, or whether we conceive Sociology as the science applied to the study of the causes and remedies of the problems of crime, labor, poverty, and dependency, as very many do, and call it "Social Pathology," or give it any of the dozen titles assigned to the field of social endeavor, we shall sorely need certain postulates as foundation stones for our structure. These postulates are the existence of a Supreme Being, the freedom of the human will, the supernatural destiny of man, and the spiritual nature of the soul. Without these truths we are hopelessly adrift, and shall reach no goal. We may study Astronomy, Geology, and Biology without these postulates (though not adequately), and we may hobnob with Materialists and Atheists in these branches, but we cannot make common cause with them in Sociology. Indeed Sociology is so intimately bound up with a correct philosophy of life that without it our lodestar is extinct, and the only reliable guide in our study is lacking. Pope Pius XI developed this truth very effectively in various parts of the encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno*. One quotation will suffice:

Although economic science and moral discipline are guided each by its own principles in its own sphere, it is false that the two orders are so distinct and alien that the former in no way depends on the latter . . . If this (moral) law be faithfully obeyed as a consequence we shall be led by progressive stages to the final end of all, God Himself.

It will be the duty of Catholics to extend the all-too-narrow common ground which some claim for Sociology and to admit non-Catholics into the wider field. The late Dr. Parker Moon aptly states:

Catholics have a special responsibility to bear as well as a special contribution to make in the solution of social problems . . . first, Catholics have a sound and wholesome philosophy, a rock of truth upon which to build; second, they possess a set of remarkably practical principles, conservative and yet progressive, for the solution of labor problems; and finally, they are building up a wonderful system of charitable institutions and welfare work that is doing much and will undoubtedly do much more in the future in the field of practical social action. As to the last named, it is clear that Catholic charity is love of God and of man whilst non-Catholic charity is, for the most part, pure philanthropy. The material good done for our neighbor, which may appear to constitute a very extensive common ground, lacks the keystone when based on a motive of pure philanthropy. Social Service as a science essentially differs with its motive.

But, could Catholic Sociology not drop the existing difference and thereby create a common ground on which all Sociologists could meet in harmony and devise methods of

remedy social evils? Why remain aloof? Why withhold our valuable contribution, so much desired and so strongly solicited? It was reported to me that one of the Catholic universities in this country is actually adopting this line of argument. What are the objections to it? In the first place, can we be correctly charged with remaining aloof when we refuse to surrender the Catholic heritage of truth in the wide field of Sociology? Is it not more correct to label the non-Catholic Sociologist a dissenter, blind to the most essential and fundamental principles established long ago, in Sociology? Besides, experience has proved that we have no diagnosis, even remotely adequate, of social problems, such as labor, crime, the family, the race, nor can we employ effective remedies without the application of the principles of scholastic philosophy, especially those propounded in the great encyclicals of Leo XIII and Pius XI. The reason for the failure of agencies and governments in their efforts to bring about social melioration must be traced to a complete disregard of these principles. The Catholic school of Sociology receives no hearing. How can this school offer anything worthwhile, they say, as long as its atmosphere is saturated with religion and the supernatural?

Addressing the American Economic Association in 1913, Franklin H. Giddings said: "He would be a bold man who today, after a thorough training in the best historical scholarship, should venture to put forth a philosophy in

terms of the divine ideas or to trace the plan of an Almighty in the sequence of human events. On the other hand, those interpretations that are characterized as materialistic . . . are daily winning serious respect." Since this attitude is a very common one in Sociology today, it is evident that our fellow Sociologists have refused to stand with us on common ground. They have agreed to disagree.

Can we perhaps classify Sociology as Catholic and non-Catholic, distinguished by view point? The answer is clear if there can be only one valid social science. Just as Communism, being essentially atheistic, can never lay claim to be recognized as a valid theory of philosophy or economics.

From what has been said in a previous section regarding the still indefinite scope of Sociology, one might infer that I consider this branch of minor importance in a Catholic college curriculum. Nothing could be further from the truth. It is my conviction that Sociology, if rightly understood and properly taught, must rank in value with Logic, Ethics, and Psychology, for the education of a college student. The purpose of a distinctly Catholic education is to give students the proper directive in life, which they cannot obtain elsewhere. It alone supplies this imperative need. The teaching in the conception and solution of the social problems is so much awry in non-Catholic colleges and universities that a Catholic course in this science is mandatory in order to supply a corrective.

The Instrument of Order

LEONARD A. WATERS

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"*Homo sapiens* can only be considered in relation to *Sapientia*; and only a book like that of St. Thomas is really devoted to the intrinsic idea of *Sapientia*.¹

It has been remarked that reading Chesterton's books is an exasperating experience because one is sure to find one's best thoughts there boldly revealed. It is the case with this paper. I am content to let Chesterton's tribute to St. Thomas stand as the "thesis" for all I am to urge.

"*Homo sapiens* can only be considered in relation to *Sapientia*." Chesterton would have called this "nursery boom" thinking; it is too simple to be thought of by perplexed grown ups. So we proceed to translate it into the argon of the "philosopher." Relatives have no meaning unless we relate them to something not in itself relative. And man is distinctly a "relative" thing. Consequently, to learn of man, to cultivate a "philosophy" of man, we must have an absolute, and a science of that Absolute by which to measure man. Stated differently, we must have knowledge of a unity that is really one, and the measure of all multiplicity. But contrarily, American philosophy in its distrust of metaphysics has violated this nursery syllogism scandalously. We have spent years trying to study *Homo sapiens* as though he had no relation to *Sapientia*. We have

then studied man as though he were *Sapientia*. What we need is the study of man as its creature.

This is the Scholastic concept of wisdom. For the benefit of scholars who have never understood mediaeval "philosophia," Chesterton proposes that we call it "Anthropology." It does not consist in denying nature study, or condemning the pursuit of science, history, mathematics or any other branch of knowledge whatsoever — though this seems to be the overmastering fear in the mind of John Dewey as he responds to President Hutchins' appeal for this very "philosophia."² It does consist in conceiving and studying these sciences as branches of knowledge, not as individual "trees" in themselves. Philosophy—"Anthropology," call it what you will—is the "tree" of knowledge; not any particular science. As such, philosophy is the justification for all the branches. It is the whole seen wholly and ultimately. It is simply the ever-renewed effort of the finite mind to see a finite world in the only perspective that makes it sane and rational, unified and purposive. The philosopher has nothing but praise for the student devoting himself to the cultivation of any known branch of knowledge. His work is to pattern these fragmentary sciences into the one absolute knowledge above them all. Philosophy directs the intention of the mind, through the

reality of being, or the power of truth; the appeal of the good, or the glory of the beautiful, to the stirring knowledge of the One, True Good, and Beauty behind them all.

If this is a far-flung conclusion, remember that it flows with the nursery room type of necessity from the very existence of limited, multiple things about us. Perhaps it is, in fact, the reason why some "philosophers" have been so anxious to deny the very existence of those things and so "end it all." The fact that the mind is not designed for this or that being, or this or that class of beings, is not within our power to alter. Intelligence is not a power to be limited by man. Limitation causes constriction, abnormality. Ultimately we are bound to build upon the fact that the proper object of man's intelligence is not nature, not art, not even man himself. It is the unlimited, transcendent expanse of being wherever it is to be found. Reality is the measure of the human mind;—and the expanse of reality is absolute. This is the Scholastic concept of the human mind and its work; any narrower concept will constrict and cripple it.

Yet this is exactly the contrary of the teaching of many American "philosophers" of the past. We narrowed reality even to the limits of mass and magnitude; we were taught to try to satisfy our human minds and human hearts with lifeless things—even with gold—and the result has been a colossal disillusionment. Then, better men with a better doctrine conceived man rightly as greater than mere matter; and there was set up the philosophy of humanism which promised so nobly a few years ago. But the promise has not been fulfilled. The Humanists, too, have fallen short of the truth. Their philosophy sets up man himself as the measure of man, and with this they are content. Humanism could raise man above the slime, indeed, but it could not raise him above himself. Its failure is suicidal, not only because it ignores the realms of reality beyond man, but especially because it is unable, in man alone, to find an adequate reason for the existence and cultivation of humanity itself.

There is a further gem of "nursery-wisdom" neatly illustrated in the grand old tale of the blind men of Hindustan and their elephant. According to the story all these worthies were sincere and intelligent investigators of the animal in question. They reported their findings accurately and built their hypotheses rigidly on the data at hand. Each of them had a true notion of the bit of reality before him; each of them knew some truth. But, nevertheless, none of them defined an elephant. The solution of this naïve tale apparently, if we are wise enough to solve it, is that the reality, even of an elephant, is much greater, grander, more complex than any of us can dream.

Perhaps we wise philosophers might learn a sublime lesson from the blind men and their elephant. Look about us! Scientists, artists, historians, mathematicians, earnest men and learned, all swarm about the entrancing reality of the universe. They cling to the legs, or grasp the tusks, or cling to the trunk of this strange beast, each and all stoutly maintaining that he has the truth. So, indeed, he has. So have they all. But yet the truth transcends each tiny grasp. Truth is indeed scientific, artistic, historical, mathematical. But at the same time, like the elephant, it is much more. We have grasped now one part of truth, now another. But truth itself is a thing wonderfully beyond any of our poor categories. Knowing art or science, we know only one facet of reality. Mastering them, we master but one aspect of being.

"*Homo Sapiens* can only be considered in relation to *Sapientia*." It is our thesis that nothing is so supremely responsible for the hierarchy of false values rampant in our disturbed "learned world" as the absence of an absolute Standard of truth — of reality — at its base. Order is heaven's (and earth's) first law. To order things we must know them. To know them we must know the absolute being to which they are related and which alone makes them intelligible. This knowledge of things by their ultimate causes is the true meaning of philosophy and is the highest activity of the human mind.

This is the culmination of Scholastic philosophy, or Anthropology, and the basis of reform in American thought and American education advocated by those familiar with Scholastic thought. The discipline contemplated by a Scholastic when he urges a return to the unity of Metaphysics is simply this pursuit of ultimate causes which leads the mind inevitably to the unity and supremacy of the Absolute behind all the phantasmagoria of passing, contingent, relative things. It is *Sapientia*, not *homo sapiens* which philosophy must use as its norm. The effect of such philosophy is synthesis. Its purpose is to carry the mind, floundering in a mire of contradictions, up to a unity which admits no contradictions. It is our hope that this purpose will be finally espoused by American thinkers who are seriously concerned with the reform of our educational system. Scholastic followers have criticised other reforms because they were partial; only if the new movement embraces a complete metaphysics—a true anthropology—a philosophy of the absolute, will it gain anything more permanent and lasting.

REFERENCES

1. St. Thomas Aquinas, Sheed & Ward (New York, 1933), p. 197.
2. See articles containing the Hutchins-Dewey controversy, *The Social Frontier*, Vol. III, 21, 22, 23, 24.

Book Reviews

REALIZATION, A PHILOSOPHY OF POETRY

Hugh M. McCarron, S. J.

Sheed and Ward, New York, 1937, \$1.75

The tentacles of mere ingenuity in some instances are fast strangling literary criticism. Successive world ideologies and ill-advised aprio-

risms, invalid often enough in their original province of knowledge, are pressed into literary service, and in their faded light many men of letters as well as a significant part of literature are reevaluated. This purposeless activity might go on endlessly with but small progress accruing to scholarship. Hence in these days when all reading is not profitable reading, it is a genuine pleasure to salute a Scholastic

humanist whose Critical Philosophy of Poetry is based on literary facts, on the poems themselves. A valid poetic basis for the analysis and synthesis that must precede generalizations can never be the poetry of just one nation or one language. Such over-simplification would presumably result in over-generalization. Father McCarron, the new director of the Department of English, Georgetown University, illustrates his points with judicious selection from the literatures of many men of many nations. His emphasis is on things, for, as he shows, poetry basically is about things. His very objectivity focuses our attention, not on the way we are looking at a thing, but on the thing we are looking at.

His restoration of the intellectual content of poetry to the place it once occupied and should always occupy shows his fine apperception of the hierarchy of literary values. Emotional Subjectivism has obscured our vision. Much called for is his realignment. If those interested in Poetry are not to feel self-conscious in the masculine company of the Economist, the Theologian, the Mathematician, then poetry must be made to be something more than a mere mood. If poetry is to engross adult men, intellectual Hemmingways or Hackenbushmids, who might grow a beard and can carry a sack of wheat, then it, in addition to saying something, must have something to say. Father McCarron's emphasis on things is by no means misplaced.

Trained in Aristotelian teleology, Father McCarron tells us perhaps better than we have heard it recently in English what poetry is for. He is ever having us consult our own poetic experiences in reading poetry. It is from our own personal experiences (*teste experientia*), other than from the citation of authorities, that he argues. His cardinal thesis, that poetry is an exercise in realization, will in my belief stand up, essentially unmodified, under even adverse criticism. Despite his clever, even brilliant critique methods, his theories have not yet been given perfect expression.

No matter how severely academic lines of interest are departmentalized in the mind or in the seminar, these boundaries are little respected by Reality. Away from the precisions of the province of the mind, apart from the divisions of graduate course numbers, real things are interrelated. This interrelation is stressed:

The mystery of contact between seer and sought seems to lie in a real relationship that could be expressed tentatively; while all things are severally, really distinct, yet they are really united. (p. 68)

If Father McCarron had been timid about mixing Religion and Poetry, we might never have had his brilliant twelfth chapter, "If this interrelation of things be founded in their relation to God; to the Word of God; to the Fulness of That Word?"

Is God the core of this interrelation? Unity appears more clearly if we consider that vital force informing the whole, the only possible reason of being, or better, The Being of being. The Being of all beings is God. God the Creator, God the Sustainer, the Mover, God, Who is in every breath of wind and blade of grass, in office buildings and subway trains, making every second anew, moving all movement, working as it were, has appeared in the person of His Christ, the Son of God. The secret mystery of reality seems to lie in this relationship at the very core of being. (p. 74)

THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN'S review of *Realization* is late enough to survey other reviews. Father McCarron seemingly has best pleased me trained in the same robust academic arena with him — Father Leonard Feeney, S. J., in *America*, June 19, 1937 (p. 261). Francis K. Connolly, too, has written a very commendatory review in *Spirit*, July, 1937, (pp. 92-94). On the other hand, in *Commonweal*, July 9, 1937 (p. 290), John Gilland Brunini thought it unfortunate that the author's choppiness of style and excess of subtleties distracted the reader from matter that demands constant attention. Without admitting the justice of this note, perhaps the novelty of presentation and the nervous brilliance of the style caused this comment. Both Father McCarron and his *Catholic World* reviewer (August, 1937, p. 633), John Kenneth Merton, who detected him in a chronological error which involved a matter of but small importance, speak of Coleridge's

hundreds of pages of indifferent verse. Leaving aside all standards save quantitative ones, is it not an overstatement to speak of hundreds of pages of any kind of this poet's verse?

The reviewers for the English and Irish journals are apparently less reserved than some of the American critics in praising something new that is good. The reviewer for the *Times Literary Supplement* (Sept. 18, 1937, p. 677) notes that Father McCarron is refreshingly averse from abstract theorizing. *Studies*, June, 1937 (pp. 343-344), points out what others were inclined to miss, that anyone wishing to acquire the technique of teaching literature or to hear the case for classical education or kindred matters, will hardly find a book where these topics are treated more deeply, more soundly, or more briefly. In *Blackfriars*, July, 1937 (p. 556), *Realization* is called an agreeably astringent book, while *Month*, Sept., 1937 (p. 284) insists that it is worthy of careful reading. Among the foreign reviewers there is not a single dissenting voice.

Important first books are usually resaid over again with greater amplification and with new and better emphasis. Father McCarron should not hesitate to remould his materials. If we are to realize the truths of *Realization*, we must hear them more than once. Even one disillusioned with literary criticism should add this short but important book to his "Must List."

PAUL F. SMITH.

SPINOZA ET LE PANTHÉISME RELIGIEUX

Paul Siwek, S. J.

Désclée De Brouwer et Cie., Paris, 1937, 20 fr.

Few scholars are better prepared than Father Siwek for a thorough study of the religious pantheism of Benedict Spinoza. Previous works published by him have led us to expect an objective, unprejudiced, yet profound and penetrating elucidation of the problem under discussion. In the present work we are especially indebted to him, for he has courageously set himself to *casser la coquille* of those formidable formulas in which the Spanish-looking Jew of Amsterdam clothed his thoughts.

Paradoxical as it may seem, this age which has witnessed a splendid return to the true meaning of the human person and of liberty, has also beheld an ever growing interest in Spinozism. One of the reasons for this is that any serious thinker interested in the problem of human destiny is bound to investigate and ponder the Spinozistic religious system.

As the author tells us in the Introduction (pp. XVII-XVIII), his aim is to put within the reach of all the authentic teachings of Spinoza, to weigh their profound significations, and show, to some extent, their consequences in the moral order.

The work is divided into two books. The first deals with the life history and personality of the philosopher. After studying the various influences that molded and formed his character, we are given a clear exposition of his religious system. Though he mocked at religion (a sephardic trait, it seems), Spinoza hotly denied that he was a theoretical atheist. He contended that he was opposed to the common "anthropomorphic" idea of God as held by the common crowd who based their knowledge on revelation. In practice, he seems to have been an Epicurean in the primitive sense of the word, seeking that peace which the world can give. Viewed in this light, his much praised love of modesty and poverty was not due to charity or mortification but to self-love of a very subtle kind.

Spinoza was not a skeptic. Man can come to know all things. Error is due to imagination. What is needed is method and there is but one method—that used by mathematicians in their operations, namely, deduction. The deductive method, to be complete, supposes intuition both in its commencement (*une idée simple et évidente*) and in its completion (*une synthèse indivisible*). "*Le point de départ*" must be a simple, self-evident idea which is the work of "Reason." Obviously, there is no idea more simple and evident than the idea of Being. But if this is true then Being is unique and all diversity and multiplicity in the world are *ipso facto* excluded. Considered as the final reason of intelligibility, that is, as "*ce dont le concept ne requiert*

pour sa formation aucun autre concept," this unique Being will be at the same time the unique Substance (p. 126). But what of the other "substances" in the world? Spinoza's theory of knowledge, intuitionism, and absolute realism based on radical rationalism forbade him to deny the visible world. To designate all in nature that appears to us to exist he uses the term "mode of the Substance." These "modes" do not really exist by themselves, they "co-exist," they are but "affections d'une substance," or "ce qui est dans une autre chose et par le moyen de laquelle il est aussi conçu" (p. 126). Hence we have a real and total identification of Substance and Being.

The theodicy of Spinoza gives us "*un Dieu de glace.*" We learn that all the commonly accepted ideas of God are anthropomorphic. God is free only in the sense that He suffers no outward restraint. Creation is an act of "free necessity." The principle of finality is flatly denied. Religion is offered to us without dogma. And since free will is denied to man, morality loses its meaning. Good and bad become empty terms. This first book ends with an account of the influence of these ideas in France and elsewhere.

In the second book, a critique of the whole system, Professor Siwek has done a fine piece of work. According to him, Spinoza's initial error consisted in applying the geometric method to philosophy. As a result he can explain only quantity not quality. His system is the "*géométrie de l'Être.*" To this method he "sacrificed" final causes, free will, knowledge gained by experience, faith, unity of the living being, etc. Trying to explain how we can have Multiplicity from One we are told that though things really exist as our senses testify that they exist, still they do not exist the way that our senses testify, for our senses perceive limits which in reality do not exist! As Siwek remarks, this solution "*est le point névralgique du système Spinoziste*" (p. 232).

Throughout the work the author shows that he has gone to the philosopher's own writings for his information. An excellent bibliography renders this work still more valuable and we are sure that Professor Siwek has written a book that cannot be disregarded by anyone interested in the philosophy of Spinoza.

JOHN L. THOMAS.

SAFEGUARDING MENTAL HEALTH

Raphael C. McCarthy, Ph. D.

Bruce Publishing Co., Milwaukee, 1937, \$2.50

Though much of the matter treated in Dr. Raphael C. McCarthy's *Safeguarding Mental Health* can be found in other works on the subject, his book is, nevertheless, a new and useful contribution to the literature of mental hygiene. First of all, *Safeguarding Mental Health* is not just another textbook. Since it is meant for the general reading public, technical terminology has been avoided, and elaborate bibliographies have not been supplied. Yet the student will also find much use for the book.

From many directions, the layman of average education has been made conscious of the problems of mental hygiene. Newspapers, magazines, and the radio tell him that mental disorders are rapidly on the increase, and that almost everyone is a potential victim. But most of the books on the subject he meets with do not take care of his needs. Either they are confined to a speculative treatment of abstract types, or else they are written from a biased viewpoint with an undesirable disregard for objectivity; e. g., books with an utterly materialistic outlook or those which give sexual maladjustments as the one source of all disorders of the mind. The book we are considering shows a wholesome, sane, and balanced attitude. The sound and well-tried criteria of Scholastic philosophy and morals are adhered to throughout.

Because mental hygiene is concerned rather with the prevention than the cure of mental diseases, the major psychoses are referred to only in passing. But the common neuroses and the slight abnormalities which lead to them are treated clearly and with considerable detail. What is more important, numerous practical and really applicable suggestions for the prevention or cure of such minor disturbances are

given in easily understandable language. This is one of the features which substantiate this book's claims as a new contribution.

Typical of Dr. McCarthy's treatment of the various ailments which very commonly interfere with a peaceful and effective mental life is his chapter entitled "The Bogey of Fear." First he distinguishes between healthy fears and abnormal ones. Then he shows that fear in one or other of its protean forms is the cause of many mental ills and bodily ailments also. Fear, as is well known, is the source of numerous digestive complaints. After explaining the nature of phobias and the way in which conditioned emotions are pyramided, Dr. McCarthy proceeds to tell his readers how the various phobias can be prevented or cured. Shame and ridicule should not be employed. If the victim is an adult with at least fair control of himself, it may be sufficient to enlighten him as to the causes of his phobias, since unfamiliarity is often the cause of unjustified fears. He should familiarize himself with the cause of his disturbances, and his fears will frequently vanish. Suggestion and autosuggestion, when skillfully employed, will prove helpful in many cases. A process of reconditioning should be used with children so that the child associates something pleasant with the person or object which he formerly regarded as harmful. Obviously, one cannot do full justice to Dr. McCarthy's handling of this problem in the limited amount of space allotted here. Yet the above description may give some idea of his thorough and practical methods. Equally interesting and profitable are his suggestions on the various defense mechanisms such as the shrinking attitude, compromising, subterfuges, blaming others, rationalization, and his discussions of day-dreaming, fear of self, hypochondria, stuttering, etc.

From the viewpoint of mental hygiene, environment is more important than heredity since most of the undesirable mental states we wish to avoid are learned. And most important of all, Dr. McCarthy is convinced from his years of experience in dealing with these matters, is the early environment of the child. The origins of very many disorders of the nervous system can be traced back to childhood. Consequently, Dr. McCarthy lays special emphasis on the rôle parents and teachers have to play in the campaign for mental health and gives valuable instructions to guide them in their important duties. The proper relations between parent and child are well described. The right affection should be shown without overcoddling. Carping criticism or manifesting preference for one child over the others is harmful. The teacher is in a position to do great good or great harm which may last throughout the child's later life. To begin with, the teacher must be well adjusted herself. Then she must know how to deal with each individual—those who are mentally inferior, the gifted child, those only apparently lazy, etc. These few notes give but a glimpse of Dr. McCarthy's program for school hygiene. His book should be in the hands of every parent and teacher.

The author regards self-control and a well balanced emotional disposition as the key to a healthy mental life. Mental hygiene consists in "cultivating the management of the emotions." Insanity is complete lack of control of the emotions. Yet management of the emotions does not mean that they should be suppressed, but that they should be used as the situation demands. There should be an adequate emotional response and no more. For a happy life, the right use of the emotions is necessary. They spur us on to action; they keep fatigue from interfering with our work. Habitual control of the emotions should be everyone's goal, and Dr. McCarthy's suggestions will be of great help in achieving it.

Intimately connected with the problem of emotional control is that of the will. If a person is afflicted with gross emotional uncontrol, there is no unity of his powers; he is insane. A weak will and neuroticism go hand in hand. The best prophylaxis against such a condition is a well trained will. By the force of a well trained will one can integrate all his traits and build up a balanced personality. The one who has suffered his volitional control to be impaired must exert himself. He is responsible to a large extent for his own cure. This means that he must submit to a process of reeducation. An important part of this process is the establishing of a plan of life and a faithful adhe-

ence to it. In this chapter much is made of will-training in the field.

Though the recent work of the more objective-minded psychologists and psychiatrists has done much to dispel the old notions about religion being harmful to mental health, much of the former prejudice still remains. In *Safeguarding Mental Health* the author points out the inconsequential nature of the common objections against religion. As he clearly demonstrates, religion is really the safeguard of sanity. This can be said, however, only of religion rightly understood. Perverted or distorted ideas of religion may undoubtedly prove detrimental, but this is no reason for condemning religion itself. To be of any help, religion must be convinced and continual. It does not act like a drug, but gives a sense of peaceful confidence. The practice of genuine religion is a curb on selfishness, which is the source of many sins. A program of mental hygiene which does not take religion into account is seriously deficient. To conclude, it should be remarked that Dr. McCarthy's treatment of the influence of the will and of the hygienic value of religion are the two chapters which definitely set his book apart from others in the field and give it a special interest and importance.

CLEMENT A. GREEN.

CURSUS PHILOSOPHIAE

(Volumen Alterum)

Carolus Boyer, S. J.

Desclée de Brouwer & Soc., Paris, 1936

The purpose of this *Cursus Philosophiae*, according to the author's preface, is to present a conspectus of the whole field of philosophy which will be in accord with the spirit of the encyclical *Studiorumducem* and, in particular, with the twenty-four theses declared to embody the authoritative teaching of St. Thomas in philosophy. This aim has been accurately achieved. These two volumes present a philosophy, ranging from minor logic to special ethics, which is internally consistent whole built rigidly on the metaphysics of act and potency. Thus it defends the most accepted interpretation of St. Thomas's immortal doctrines and enforces its interpretation by reasoning drawn closely from the works of St. Thomas himself. It is an altogether sane book, conservatively and tactfully written, shunning pomosity, and conciliating, as far as possible, any philosophical opinions at variance with the "twenty-four theses."

From this survey we might conclude that the *Cursus Philosophiae* achieves that perfect exposition and introduction to St. Thomas so long desired by teachers and students.

But one feels that the scope of the book is too great for its actual size. The author seems always hurried; the theses are highly compressed; and often the barest skeleton of explanation or analysis of the problem precedes each question. The formal treatise on the will, for example, receives a bare twenty pages, the whole treatise of theodicy but 125 pages. Writers of compendia, historically, have always labored under the disadvantage that they must leave unsaid so much that ought to be said, and must say so much in a stark and unqualified way. This fault is anticipated, and in some degree parried in the present work, by the author's close reference to St. Thomas and by his excellent device of quoting frequently and at some length from the original works of ancient and modern philosophers.

Another limitation, however, which is not so well overcome is that impression of over-intellectualism, of a rather cut-and-dried attitude which philosophical summaries and the thesis method tend to force upon their writers. Students must have more time to analyze and formulate in their minds the very problems embodied in a thesis of philosophy than a text book devotes to the exposition of a whole tractate. We, most of us, think in the leisurely, assimilative way of Plato; we are here taught in the crisp shorthand phrases of Aristotle. Unless other books, sources, or a teacher, fill in these lacunae between definitions and syllogisms and the real world of experience we will half understand or misunderstand any course of philosophy. Exposition of the bare truth is not enough. As philosophers we must learn to seek the warmth of goodness and the glow of beauty in things

as well. It is undoubtedly the mind of the author of this *Cursus Philosophiae* that such things be supplied by the teacher who shall use this book.

The second volume, which is particularly under review here, treats Sense and Rational Psychology, "Metaphysics with Natural Theology," and Ethics. It is altogether an excellent piece of work, harmonizing the most modern facts and problems with the perennial principles of Scholasticism in a skillful and scholarly way. But the metaphysics section is disappointing. It is a resumption of the study of "being" under such aspects as were omitted in the metaphysics of the first volume; and is placed as an introduction to Theodicy. This partition and subordination of metaphysics appears to be an error in method liable to be damaging to the real power of Scholastic philosophy. If there is anything which salutarily distinguishes Scholastic philosophy from the dozens of scientific philosophies held by moderns, it is the absolute and integrated basis of *being* upon which St. Thomas is able to transcend the physical and mathematical order of things and establish the science of sciences — metaphysics. The question here, then, is one of emphasis. Instead of concentrating on this primacy of *being*, the author seems to fasten our minds on the particular problems of cosmology and psychology, relegating metaphysics to the rôle of an auxiliary science to be utilized at need. Thus the treatment of the philosophy of *being* in this work is found in three sections: in the introductory metaphysics, in cosmology, and in natural theology. Pedagogically we may be mistaken, but we would much prefer to see Scholastic philosophy grow organically in students' minds from the root of *being*. Furthermore, it is not until this last half of the second volume, under this arrangement, that we come upon the treatment of the transcendentals. It would seem confusing to offer students the whole of philosophy, psychology included, before the treatment of *veritas* and *bonum* which are the life and breath of the whole doctrine.

We should be misunderstood if any criticism we have offered should give the impression of overshadowing the solid value of this book. It is a text eminently worthy of being taught in any curriculum of Scholastic philosophy. We can only recommend it again, and hope that it will rapidly become known and play its part in the growth of Neo-Scholasticism in America.

LEONARD A. WATERS.

LIBERTY — ITS USE AND ABUSE

Ignatius W. Cox, S.J., Ph.D.

Vol. I, Basic Principles of Ethics, 168 pp., \$2.00

Vol. II, Applied Principles of Ethics, 273 pp., \$2.25

Fordham University Press, New York, 1936

The price of this textbook of Scholastic ethics is excessive, especially that of Volume I. Unless students are asked to pay considerably less than one cent per page for a text (no matter how good the content), I believe they are justified in feeling they are being "gouged." This is particularly true when—as in the present case—the work is only a re-editing of another professor's notes. I have before me an ethics textbook published by one of our firms whose books are generally considered high-priced; but it contains 470 pages and sells for \$2.50. If *Liberty—Its Use and Abuse* were bound into one volume and sold for about \$2.50, it would be a very acceptable book at a reasonable price. Moreover, binding it into one volume would increase its value; for most of our students study the complete course of ethics, and it would be very useful, when applying the principles, to have easy access to the principles themselves on which the applications are based.

But the book will be a blessing for professors and students. It is clear and orderly; it eliminates the self-contradictions and useless

CORRECTION

In Volume 14, page 82: Read: "for the most part produces returns," instead of the editorial slip, "greatest possible returns."

repetition of former editing of Father Brosnahan's notes; it translates Latin words into English instead of transliterating them.

Some will undoubtedly find the book somewhat compressed and jerky, but this is due to the necessity of including a great quantity of matter in a moderate-sized compass. It is designed to serve as a textbook and to be used under the guidance of a skilled instructor who will expand the topics in his lectures and illustrate them with suitable examples. Scholasticism has much to say in the field of ethics; and if the writer sits down with his readers and entertains them with friendly conversation on all the applications of ethics, his book will grow to gigantic bulk.

S. J. RUEVE.

REORGANIZATION OF SOCIAL ECONOMY

Oswald von Nell-Breuning, S. J.

English Edition prepared by Bernard W. Dempsey, S. J.

Bruce Publishing Co., Milwaukee, 1936, \$3.50

For English-speaking people this recent analysis of *Quadragesimo Anno*, written by an eminent German economist, is more than an introduction to the Encyclical on Social Order. It is altogether the most thorough and satisfying explanation and development of the Social Encyclical that has appeared in this country up to the present.

Designed for general information and practical use, the book is made easily available for these purposes by the presentation at the beginning of each chapter of the section of the Encyclical which is under consideration. The book is further enhanced by the complete bibliography given at the end of the chapters with pertinent references to the standard works and current articles on the principal topics suggested by that section. An additional stimulus to the reader is offered by breaking each chapter into numerous subheadings specifically related to the paragraphs of the Encyclical itself, and also by prefacing five or six controversial questions based on these sub-headings. Thus every attempt is made to preserve the continuity and sequence of the Encyclical and to show clearly the interrelation of its parts.

Of particular interest and value is Father Nell-Breuning's treatment of the second principal division of *Quadragesimo Anno*, namely, Pope Pius XI's interpretation and amplification of the doctrine of *Rerum Novarum*. It is an adequate defense against the assertion that that Encyclical is abstruse and difficult to understand. It is at the same time a refutation of those who place extreme interpretations on certain passages of the Encyclical, and thereby give some foundation for the statements of the ill-disposed who consider the Pope's doctrine as too idealistic and visionary. The first assertion is based on a failure to appreciate the depth and compactness of the Holy Father's thought; the second, on a failure to grasp the subject as a whole, due to insufficient knowledge of all its aspects.

JOHN M. CORRIDAN.

ON BEING HUMAN

Paul Elmer More

Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1936, \$2.00

Tenuously unified by a fugue theme of humanism, *On Being Human* is a collection of seven essays and two occasional addresses. All of the component pieces have been previously published and are now gathered between covers to constitute the third volume of the New Shelburne Essays. The result is a charming book, and an annoying one. It will be read with interest, but not with equanimity.

"A Revival of Humanism," the opening study, is a comment on *Humanism and America*, a miscellany written by fifteen humanists under the stimulating editorship of the militant Professor Norman Foerster. On certain points, the contributors are in perfect agreement; on others, they are split into various camps. Professor More thinks that an examination of the points of agreement and divergence might clarify central issues, and do much towards bringing about an *entente* within the humanistic ranks.

With one voice all concede that futility is the key-note of modern art and that "the present confusion in letters is connected with a

similar confusion in our ideas of life." But discussions of that kind are secondary to the real core of the matter, the issue which "cannot be bludgeoned into silence or circumvented." This is "the relation of humanism to religion." Some few humanists hold that a belief in the supernatural is essentially intransigent with humanism; another small group contends that humanism without religion is impossible; and the majority, while differing on religion, its nature and its purposes, thinks that the humanistic regeneration of art can be accomplished without its aid.

In delineating his own position, Professor More does not make it unequivocally clear that he is on the side of the angels. Hypothetical phrases weaken his admission of the need of the supernatural. But granting that religion is necessary, what kind of religion should it be? No mere "vague acquiescence in a vaguer conception of something divine," More asserts. "It must be a militant force that will intermeddle with the whole of life, exacting obedience and arousing enmities." Claiming that religion, as he has described it, has been present in the background of every great artistic epoch, the author adds that it "does not automatically produce a humanistic age, while in some of its manifestations it has been actually antagonistic to art and humane letters." And there Professor More rests his case. In this, as in some of his other writings, he recalls Claudel's description of Nijinsky's dancing. Light as a panther, muscled with springs he would leap up and up until, just when one might think he had vanquished gravity and sloughed the clinging clay, he would float down to sublime defeat.

Four of the remaining essays are appraisals of individual authors: Irving Babbitt, Marcel Proust, James Joyce, and Baron von Hügel. Sound criticism and disputable declaration walk hand in hand through these pages. "The Modernism of French Poetry" is a study of cyclic literary influence, tracing down to Poe, Whitman, and Henry James, the French outlook on letters which so left its mark on James Joyce. The study reveals the evolution of symbolism into surrealism and summarizes Marcel Raymond's *De Baudelaire au surréalisme*. A practical example of the psychological approach to literature, "How to Read *Lycidas*," stresses the importance of remembering Milton's egoism and his hierophantic dedication of himself to poetry, as a background in reading the famous threnody.

To comment briefly on the two addresses "Religion and Social Discontent" and "Church and Politics" would be to run the risk of misrepresenting their author. To comment on them adequately would mean the extension of this review to absurd length.

The book will repay its readers. It is a serious work, not to be read lightly or quickly; it is a sincere work, portraying a human mind in quest of the immortal Sangreal, truth; it is an urbane work, reflecting the culture and quiet self-possession of a gentlemanly controversialist.

WILLIAM A. DONAGHY.

BUSINESS ETHICS

Frank Chapman Sharp and Philip G. Fox

D. Appleton Century Company, New York, 1937, \$2.25

Business Ethics might well be considered a vigorous protest against the common misapprehension of some that on entering the troubled sea of modern business a competitor must either jettison the ethical principles and moral standards which govern his conduct in private life or, encumbered with them sink into the black waters of failure. But it is more than a protest. As a text book for college and university students it presents a positive philosophy of business with "the purpose of helping to determine what business practices are right and what wrong." The aim throughout the book is constructive and seeks as its ultimate goal the discovery of what modes of positive action the spirit of fairness requires in its application to business life.

To attain this end the authors examine the relationship between buyer and seller and between competitors, in order to answer the basic questions which concern the business world today: What constitutes fair service? What constitutes fair practices among competitors? What is a fair price? What is a just wage? The answers to these questions in the present text are found to lie at the very antipodes of

those given by many business men whose mistaken attitude towards their competitors leaves them with the necessary alternatives of "either kill you or you kill me, as in an interview with a tiger." Because of his disparity many interesting examples can be cited which reproach that unscrupulous legion of men whose only norm of morality is the callous one of expediency: that action is good which benefits the company; that is bad which hinders the company's business.

To determine what is good and what is bad morally, the authors propose the following test which can be applied to most business transactions:

To discover whether a given act is right or wrong we must first ask, with what intent was it done; what consequences did the agent believe would follow his act? Morality is a matter of intent; the rightness or wrongness of an act turns on the answer to the question: what are you up to? and if your intent is unjustified the means you use make no difference in its character.

With this simple definition as his guide the reader travels through the realms of business where problems are constantly being proposed which need only the application of the above stated norm for their solution. In questions where a legal answer has been given, the norm of intent is careful to check the Court's decision and even if a discrepancy results, the reader is warned against a too hasty judgment in favor of the law.

This intent, as limited by the authors, does determine the moral good or evil of a human act since it includes the end, the object, and the circumstances of any single operation. But here appears a weakness common to many ethical systems. The norm set down in *Business Ethics* does not account for obligation on the part of the business man in a satisfactory manner. Unless a Theistic basis is presupposed the norm of intent does not seem to be complete. What is left unanswered is the ultimate question: Why is the agent obliged to choose the right and avoid the known wrong? Unless obligation to the Supreme Lawgiver and Governor of the universe is the basis of ethics the ultimate why of morality cannot be satisfactorily answered.

Business Ethics is highly commendable for the sincere effort it makes to raise business dealings to a higher plane. The clear, orderly presentation of interesting matter enhances the value of the book as a text for college students.

THOMAS J. KELLY.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF JAMES' ESSAY

Arthur Lapan

Journal of Philosophy, Inc., New York, 1936, \$0.75

This doctoral dissertation attempts to show the influence of William James' essay, "Does Consciousness Exist?" Its scope and manner of approach may most quickly be indicated by enumerating the chapter headings: "Subject Matter," "Method," "Cognition," "Men and Life," and "Pure Experience and Nature." The booklet on the whole gives evidence of scholarly work.

For a convenient résumé of the various factors responsible for the attitudes and beliefs of many American psychologists, this work will have a real value. The author attempts to show that the change within the last half-century in many of the concepts which are the psychologist's stock in trade was due to the work of William James, and in particular to the essay named. His thesis is substantiated by many apt quotations.

The work also serves, apparently not intentionally, as a running commentary upon the uncritical attitude of the men who moulded American psychological thought. A constantly recurring phrase is: "is was now 'taken to be.'" Not once do we see "this was proved to be."

GEORGE P. KLUBERTANZ.

Centuries, opens up a field of inquiry which has long been neglected. Historians of science have written volumes which trace scientific results through the centuries. Histories of philosophy have presented the development of philosophical thought from earliest times to the present day. Philosophies of science have been published. But few are the books that treat specifically and in a scholarly way the development of scientific thought. Strong's historical and critical study of mathematical and physical science in the 16th and 17th centuries is a book of this type.

Partly to fill out certain lacunae, but more particularly as an opposition to the thesis advanced by E. A. Burtt in *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science* that "regards the Platonic and Pythagorean tradition . . . as having provided a foundation and justification for modern science" (p. 4), Strong gives his answer to the question, *Procedures or metaphysics?* He feels that "mechanical knowledge marches by method, not by metaphysics" (p. 8). While not denying that there are to be found in Galileo's science metaphysical implications which point to a new metaphysics (a mathematical interpretation of nature), the author thinks that to view this mathematical interpretation of nature as a foundation for Galileo's procedures is entirely unjustified.

After tracing in chronological sequence the development of the metamathematical tradition from Plato to Proclus, Strong presents a historical and critical study "of scientific work and opinion of the early-modern period, conjoined with a correlated study of the mathematical aspect of the Platonic tradition." The investigation culminates in Galileo and Kepler. According to Strong,

the methodological position brought out in the study of the Italian investigators and the analysis of the development of methodological insight in Kepler culminating in the *Epitome* constitute an appreciable weight of evidence for the thesis that operational considerations existed in the early-modern period without being based upon metamathematical foundations and without requiring subsequent metaphysical arguments, distinctions, and sanctions (p. 183).

The work is fully documented. However the relegation of notes to the end of the book, while presenting an unencumbered text, is likely to prove irksome to certain impatient readers.

Strong's study of sixteenth and seventeenth century science is an able piece of work. It will certainly prove valuable to all who are interested in philosophy, mathematics, and the history of science.

EVERETT H. LARGUER.

DE DIVISIONE CAUSAE EXEMPLARIS

APUD S. THOMAM

T. M. Sparks, O.P.

The Rosary Press, Somerset, Ohio, 1936, \$1.00

The problem of exemplary causality has been widely discussed ever since Plato offered his theory of ideas. In Christian philosophy the question has received new depth, difficulty, and importance, for there has been the added necessity of determining the relation of efficient causality to God as well as to creature. Not only the Scholastic or Thomist, then, but any one interested in philosophy will find much of interest and value in this discussion of St. Thomas' doctrine of exemplary causes.

The author has divided his sixty-one pages into an introduction and five chapters. In the introduction he gives a brief history and orientation of his problem. In the first chapter he has compiled and commented upon texts in which St. Thomas discusses exemplary causes "formally and ex professo"; in the next three he discusses the important "efficient exemplary" cause; in the final chapter he sums up the kinds and importance of these causes in the mind of St. Thomas, and in the light of this teaching evaluates the positions of Plato, Aristotle, the Neo-Platonists and Arabs, and the Idealists.

There is a wealth of quoted texts and an even greater wealth of references; the comments are quite intelligent. Although the Latin

PROCEDURES AND METAPHYSICS

Edward W. Strong

University of California Press, Berkeley, 1936, \$2.50

This book, bearing the subtitle, *A Study in the Philosophy of Mathematical-Physical Science in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth*

in which it is written may restrict the value of the book for disseminating knowledge of St. Thomas outside Scholastic circles to a certain extent, still its precision, conciseness, and simplicity will enhance its appeal among those who read the language of St. Thomas even haltingly.

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W. L. ROSSNER.

PRINCIPLES OF CORRECT THINKING

Charles H. Patterson, Ph. D.

Longmans, Green and Co., New York, 1937, \$2.50

The approach to the problems of correct thinking adopted by Professor Patterson is intensely practical. Convinced that college students must be afforded some protection against the uncritical acceptance of the dogmatic utterances of the popular scientists and the philosophical and literary pundits, he has almost entirely neglected the other purposes of a beginner's course in logic—mental discipline, introduction to metaphysics, preparation for more advanced reading in philosophy—to give the student a knowledge of the requirements of correct thinking as an adequate measure for evaluating and criticizing work done in various fields. Logic is a functioning necessity, and the book is designed to prepare students to do more effective work in the sciences and social studies.

The traditional Aristotelian logic is briefly and effectively presented, with emphasis on the external signs of thought, the term and the proposition, rather than on the internal acts of the mind. The inductive method is given more extended treatment; but the organic nature of thought is emphasized throughout.

The chief defect of Bacon's logic, as we view it today, was his failure to appreciate the importance of deductive reasoning in connection with the development of science. He did not recognize the interdependence of induction and deduction or the way in which both of these are related to the scientific imagination (p. 157).

The questions and exercises at the end of each chapter, the stimulating examples of the logical processes involved in reaching a just conclusion, such as accounts of Pasteur's experiments disproving spontaneous generation, of the Michelson-Morley experiment, of famous law cases, and the selections from Plato's *Laches* and Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* make the book more interesting and more valuable to the student. The acceptance of some of the postulates of modern psychology and the use of psychological terms tend to obscure, at least for beginners, the clarity and precision of presentation.

WILLIAM C. GRUMMEL

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ST. THOMAS AND THE LIFE OF LEARNING

John F. McCormick, S. J.

Marquette University Press, Milwaukee, 1937

This excellent little brochure (25 pages) presents the "Aquinas Lecture, 1937" delivered before the Aristotelian Society of Marquette University by the head of the department of philosophy of Loyola University. Father McCormick and this philosophical society have both been outstanding in directing the minds of students in this country to the philosophy of St. Thomas, and this lecture well indicates the great objective that has inspired their work—the Thomistic "life of learning."

The lecture, in a way, turns St. Thomas' keen mind back upon itself. It seeks to discover the nature and purpose of the mind, as one of the world's greatest minds conceived it. The conclusions are most stimulating for those of us who are now following the great thinkers of the past in the search for truth. For St. Thomas, learning was simply the love of truth. Modern learning, somehow, with all its paraphernalia for accuracy seems unable to enkindle the warm beauty of Thomas' knowledge. Is this perhaps because the goal of modern scholarship is *knowledge*, while that of St. Thomas' life was *wisdom*? It is only with such distinctions clearly thought out that modern students may hope to train themselves in a worthy life of learning.

L. A. WATERS.

PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND GOVERNMENT

John P. Noonan, S. J., A. M., J. D.

Mentzer, Bush & Co., Chicago, \$1.50

A student who had attended a series of lectures for which this volume was the prescribed text, could use the book profitably as the basis for repetition work or as a means to refresh his mind on a subject once known, but slipping out of his grasp. But in itself the book is not satisfactory. In the first part, which is devoted to Law, the presentation has not that accuracy which is expected. Besides, there is an unevenness of treatment of the various topics; one is accorded a detailed accounting which is not given to another. Moreover, there are defects in rhetoric and grammar that ought to have been eliminated, especially since "there is no other one book in English, or indeed in any language, which covers this field" (Preface, p. 4). A book which aspires to fill such a niche ought to be perfect.

The second part of the work, on Government, is a much better piece of work. The basis of the discussion is Edmund Burke's political philosophy. Here the concrete thought of the Englishman furnishes a definite and sound point of reference for the evaluation and criticism of both true and supposititious functions of government. One point, however, could be made clearer, the three-fold basis on which governmental practices are based. There are in the first place those practices which should prevail in the ideally perfect civil society; secondly, there are modifications which prudence dictates ought to be made quite generally because men do not come up to the ideal; and, finally, there are fields in which government may choose one or another mode of action, or may be forced by practical considerations to follow the theoretically worse course of action. This point ought to be made clear, lest a practise that is based on the second or third above-named foundation, should be considered by the student to have all the force of a conclusion derived from the first principle.

J. E. CANTWELL.